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Abstract
This paper discusses the emergence of endogenous redistributive
cycles in a stochastic growth model with incomplete asset markets and
heterogeneous agents, where agents vote on the degree of progres-
sivity in the taxtransferscheme. The model draws from Bénabou
(1996) and ties the bias in the distribution of political power to the
degree of inequality in the society, thereby triggering redistributive cy-
cles which then give rise to a nonlinear, cyclical pattern of savings
rates, growth and inequality over time.
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In this paper, we present a model of stochastic growth with incomplete asset
markets and heterogeneous agents, where redistributive cycles and cyclical
growth emerge as an outcome of voting processes over public taxtransfer
schemes. The focus on distributional conicts in an endogenous growth
setting relates our work to recent research in the eld of politicoeconomic
analysis and income distribution.1
Regarding the political decision rule, a substantial part of the literature
treats this as exogenously given. The commonly employed approach is the
one of simple majority voting, where the median voter is the pivotal indi-
vidual and his preferences determine the outcome of the democratic pro-
cess; see for instance Bertola (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993, 1997),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Piketty (1995),
Krusell et al. (1997), or more recently Plümper and Martin (2003). How-
ever, as Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) point out, the political economy
decision mechanism may itself be endogenous to the process of economic
development.
By now, only a limited number of contributions extend the analysis in
this direction. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) discuss an endogenously
determined process of democratization in an oligarchyruledeconomy. Ades
and Verdier (1996) consider entry costs to the decision making elite, while
Gradstein and Justman (1995) assume that the franchise is limited by the
level of income. Political participation then increases throughout the growth
process. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) discuss a model, where the rich
may choose to extend the franchise in order to prevent the economy from
insurrection and associated threats of expropriation.
In this article, we discuss this issue in a model of cyclical dynamics which
occur because of the dynamic interaction between political and economic
decisions. We consider it a worthwhile extension to make the political deci-
sion mechanism endogenous to the dynamics of inequality along the growth
path. Our analysis is related to the framework developed by Bénabou (1996,
2000), which displays the convenient feature that the behavioral relation-
ships between the macroeconomic variables are grounded in the intertem-
poral optimization decisions of single agents, while preserving analytical
tractability and allowing for closedform solutions of the income dynamics
and the endogenously determined wealth distribution.
1For surveys see Aghion et al. (1999) or Drazen (2000, ch. 11).
1We follow Bénabou (1996, 2000) in assuming that the political inuence
is unevenly distributed in the society and pressure groups have the power
to enforce redistributive policies which are favorable to them. Yet, contrary
to Benabou's approach, we do not x the rank of the critical pressure group
in the wealth distribution at an exogenous ad hoc level, but allow for en-
dogenous shifts in the political bias by tying it to the dynamics of income
inequality.
Altogether, this indicates a dynamic process, where the distribution of
political power is shifting over time. In order to generate redistributive cy-
cles it is sufcient to assume that the bias in public decisionmaking is mov-
ing towards the poor, if the society is highly polarized and wealth inequality
is large, while political power shifts towards the upper income classes, if
redistribution becomes too equalizing.
Our argument is motivated by various competing forces affecting the
agents' voting behavior: On the one hand, redistribution provides an insur-
ance against unfavorable outcomes and therefore is preferred by risk averse
but, moreover, also by inequality averse agents, who value comparably egal-
itarian societies with a low degree of income mobility. Stronger social afn-
ity then goes along with a larger amount of redistribution (Lindert, 1996).
On the other hand, to the extent past incomes determine the current level of
income and random income components are diversied, individual income
mobility is limited. Consequently, an agent facing relatively small prospects
of upward income mobility might tend to vote against redistribution (Bén-
abou and Ok, 2001). This effect can be reinforced if individuals also care
for their social status (Corneo and Grüner, 2000).
The link between wealth inequality and the bias in political participa-
tion is established exogenously, but can be motivated in several ways: First
of all, one might argue that the rich have advantages in building up pres-
sure groups, for instance, by employing networks, whereas the poor are less
organized. Furthermore, it is easier for the rich to raise funds for lobbying
activities. Empirical evidence suggests a comparably small degree of politi-
cal participation in the lower income classes; see Shields and Goidel (1997)
or Bénabou (2000, and references therein). The low polling rates of the
poor can be explained with the presence of opportunity costs, i. e. the poor
are primarily concerned with earning their living, as well as with the pres-
ence of a certain apathy or frustration regarding the political process. Apart
from this, the motivation to engage actively in the political process might be
less pronounced in a relatively egalitarian society. Contrary, if the perceived
2extent of inequality becomes too large, inequality aversion might cause an
increase in political participation of the lower income classes, where the
threat of a sociopolitically instable economy even lets the rich support a
certain degree of redistribution (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996).
Individual income mobility in our model stems from the realization of
idiosyncratic shocks in the presence of credit constraints and imperfect mar-
kets for pooling risks. From the literature it is wellknown that, in this
case, redistribution may enhance growth (cf. Banerjee and Newman, 1991;
Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Perotti, 1993; Piketty,
1997; Krusell and Smith, 1998; Matsuyama, 2000).
Redistributive politics then affect growth via associated adjustments in
the individual savings rates. Combined with a voting system, where the
future distribution of political power is endogenously determined by the
current state of wealth inequality, redistributive cycles trigger growth cycles,
such that periods of high growth and a low degree of redistribution take
turns with intervals of heavy redistribution and correspondinglylow growth.
In this context, the nonlinear patterns of savings and growth rates observed
in our model stand in the tradition of the contributions of Kaldor (1940) and
Goodwin (1951), although it is important to stress that, here, cycles stem
from voting processes over redistributive tax schemes instead of arising from
imbalances between saving and investment or class conicts in the classical
sense.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the general frame-
work where income and wealth dynamics are derived within an overlapping
generations setting. Section 3 introduces the political mechanism of biased
majority voting, where we assume the political weight of a single agent to
depend on his absolute level of wealth. We start this section with providing
results related to existence and stability of equilibria for the case of an ex-
ogenously xed political bias before turning to the actual point of interest,
namelythe endogenouslydetermined political mechanism, which ultimately
gives rise to redistributive cycles. Section 4 concludes. For easier readability,
all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Income dynamics and redistribution in an OG growth
model
Our analysis contributes to the strand of research explaining distributional
dynamics as the outcome of stochastic processes in a dynastic context; see
3e. g. Becker and Tomes (1979) or Loury (1981). The underlying framework
draws from Bénabou (1996, 2000). Utility maximizing individuals choose
their preferred extent of redistribution and vote on taxtransferschemes
in a collective decision process. Growth and redistributive cycles occur, if
we introduce deviations from simple majority voting by assuming a biased
political process, and, in particular, if we allow this bias to vary over time.
Depending on the outcome of the voting process, the amount to be redis-
tributed varies continuously. The model also shows the wellknown tradeoff
between equity and efciency (Mirrlees, 1971). Redistribution comes at the
cost of a lower endogenously determined growth rate.
The model The economy is populated by a continuum of overlapping gen-
erations families, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. We disregard population growth, i. e.
each agent has exactly one offspring. Agents have preferences dened over
their own consumption ci
t, as well as their child's income yi
t+1
Ui
t = ln ci
t +g ln yi
t+1 : (1)
g > 0 denotes the utility weight, the parents attach to their children's future
income endowment. Additionally, we consider an incomplete market econ-
omy, where credit markets are missing. The income of agent i depends on
her stock of (human or physical) capital ki
t, the average stock of capital kt,











Here, A > 0 denotes the usual productivity parameter. The production tech-
nology (2) is concave in the individual variables. In the spirit of Romer
(1986), the average stock of capital kt represents the level of technical
knowledge available in the economy and is enhanced by individual capi-
tal investments. Altogether, the technology (2) meets the conditions for
ongoing growth of per capita incomes.
Parents are able to invest in the capital stock of their children. However,
a redistributive system maps the agent's savings xi
t into the child's capital







borrowed from Bénabou (1996, 2000), and previously employed for in-
stance by Feldstein (1969) and Kanbur (1979). Here, ˆ xi
t denotes posttax
investment. The progressivity of this system is measured by the elasticity of
4posttax investment tt. For t > 0, the marginal rate rises with pretax invest-
ment, for t<0, the scheme is regressive. The breakeven level, ˜ xt, separates
the winners from the taxtransfersystem from the losers, by dening the
margin, where pre and posttax investment are equal and the associated
household receives a zero net gain from redistribution. ˜ xt is determined by
the government's budget constraint which requires net transfers summing














t di : (4)
The offspring's capital stock ki
t+1 is also subject to an individual `ability' shock
zi








The major difference between the two shocks, ui
t;zi
t, is their date of realiza-
tion. The underlying timing of shocks allows us to explicitly take account of
the insurance property of redistribution (Varian, 1980). While ui
t occurs be-
fore redistributive measures are effective, the second shock, zi
t, takes place
afterwards, by this remaining an uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
Utility maximization of agent i with respect to ci
t and xi




t, the production function (2), and the redistribu-
tive scheme (3), then implies that the all agents save the identical fraction








The savings rate, s(tt), depends on the parameter measuring tax progression
tt, thereby reecting the wellknown result that individual decisions are dis-
torted by the presence of a redistributive tax system, with s0(t) < 0. Since
we argue within an endogenous growth framework, this distortion conse-
quently reduces the longrun growth rate of the economy, thus causing the
above mentioned efciency costs of redistribution (cf. Mirrlees, 1971).
Under the assumption of lognormallydistributed exogenousdisturbances,
the resulting wealth distribution is lognormal, whenever the initial distribu-
tion is lognormal too, as we have already mentioned above. We assume
ln ki
t  N (µt; s2
t ), where s2
t denotes the variance of ln ki
t in period t, mea-




where µt denotes mean (log) wealth. By using equations (2), (5), and (6),
we obtain a stochastic difference equation, describing the evolution of (log)
5wealth over time for family i (see the Appendix for derivation):
ln ki
t+1 = ln zi
t +(1 tt) ln ui













Equation (7) completely describes the dynamics of the wealth distribution
for a given redistributive scheme. In each period, wealth is lognormally
distributed, that is ln ki
t  N (µt; s2
t ) with mean µt and wealth inequality s2
t
evolving according to:

























Mean wealth dynamics in general are negatively related to risk. The impact
of the parents' risk (s2
u) is mitigated by the redistributive system, thereby
reecting the insurance property of taxation, whereas the offspring's risk
(s2
z) cannot be diversied. As usual, mean wealth increases with a rise in
the propensity to save.
If we look at the evolution of wealth inequality (8b), it becomes obvi-
ous how an increase in the progressivity of the tax system reduces wealth
inequality.2 While the effects from the initial wealth inequality and from the
individual production risk of the parent generation on the resulting wealth
distribution are weakened, the effect of the ability shocks affecting the fu-
ture generation is left unchanged. This outcome can be ascribed to the
fact that the underlying redistributive system does not provide an insurance
against these shocks.
The growth rate of income Since we are dealing with a typical model
of endogenous growth, the growth rate of average income depends on sev-
eral factors, the rst being the endogenously determined propensity to save,
which, indirectly, also establishes a link between the degree of tax progres-
sion and growth. Because we assumed imperfect capital markets, differ-
ences in the marginal productivity of the individual capital stocks are not
leveled out by borrowing and lending. For this reason, the growth rate is
also affected by the distribution of wealth. The assumed concavity of the
2 Stability of (8b) requires the set of feasible tax rates which are consistent with a political
equilibriumto be bounded below, that is, we restrict our analysis to t2(t;1], with t=1 1=b.
6production function, i. e. decreasing returns with respect to individual in-
puts, implies that a more unequal distribution of wealth goes along with
smaller average output; see Aghion et al. (1999, p. 1624) and Bénabou
(2000). These two effects appear in the following denition of the growth
rate of average income gy;t+1  D ln ¯ yt+1:









Proposition 1 (Growth effects of inequality and taxation)
(i) The growth rate of average income unambiguously rises with a decrease
in wealth inequality, ¶gy;t+1=¶s2
t < 0 .
(ii) The response of the growth rate of average income to a change in the
degree of tax progression is of ambiguous sign. With s0(tt) < 0,
¶gy;t+1
¶tt










The growth rate increases if the marginal (positive) efciency effect from
a more equal distribution of wealth outweighs the marginal (negative)
incentive effect of taxation on savings and vice versa.
As can be seen from equation (9), a more unequal distribution of wealth 
measured by the current state of inequality s2
t and affected by the extent
of redistributive activities  goes along with a lower growth rate. This is
caused by the combination of imperfect capital markets, together with the
concavity property of the production function. Conversely, growth could be
higher in a more equal society, thereby reecting an opportunityenhancing
effect (Aghion et al., 1999) of redistribution. Equation (9) also illustrates
that an increase in redistributive taxes results in two competing effects on
growth. The rst is the wellknown distortionary effect on savings, which is
harmful to growth. The second one is related to the opportunityenhancing
effect and also reects the insurance effect of taxation (Domar and Mus-
grave, 1944; Varian, 1980). It is promoting growth, because the more equal
wealth distribution from an increase in taxes ultimately results in a higher
level of output, due to the concavity of the production function. Of course,
we restrict parameterization of the model such that positive values of (9)
are sustained in the long run and the economy evolves along a path charac-
terized by an ongoing increase in per capita incomes.
73 The politicoeconomic equilibrium
By now, we have established a link between individual savings, the distribu-
tion of wealth and growth for a given taxtransfer scheme. So, the natural
next step of the analysis is to discuss the interaction between these variables
and the effects of redistributive politics on the economic system, if agents
are allowed to vote on the degree of tax progression within a democratic
process.
Empirical evidence suggests that the relatively poor engage in the demo-
cratic process less actively than the wealthier classes, see Shields and Goidel
(1997, and references therein). Among others, Bénabou (1996, 2000) ar-
gues that this indicates the presence of biases in the political system which
have to be taken into account in economic analysis.
Deviations from the purely democratic one manone vote system can be
motivated in several ways: On the one hand, one might argue that it is
easier for the rich to raise funds for lobbying activities and that they face
less frictions in coordinating themselves in pressure groups by building up
networks. The comparably low polling of the lower income classes can then
be explained with a less organized structure of interest groups, a general
feeling of individual powerlessness or annoyance about political represen-
tatives, and, perhaps, with the simple explanation that individuals are more
concerned with earning their living and do not actively participate in demo-
cratic processes for opportunity costs reasons. With regard to the extent of
redistributive activities in the society, the underrepresentation of the poor in
the political process then results in less redistribution.
On the other hand, one might also take the view that inequality aversion
brings masses to raise, whenever from their point of view the perceived
extent of inequality becomes too large. The economy faces the risk of socio
political instability, where the threat of being expropriated might cause the
rich to support a larger amount of redistribution. Contrary, a large degree
of equality, achieved by an extensive amount of redistribution and publicly
provided insurance, dampens the chances of upward mobility and provides
incentives to vote against redistribution.
Altogether, these arguments indicate that inequality itself might be a rel-
evant variable in the explanation of biases in the political system, such that
changes in the distribution of wealth also trigger corresponding movements
in the degree of political participation. In what follows, we will assume
that the position of the pivotal agent in the wealth distribution changes
8over time according to the extent wealth inequality evolves. In particular,
it is assumed that poor people gain political inuence, whenever inequality
grows too large and that rich people dominate the voting process, when-
ever inequality is low. Redistributive cycles originate in our analysis from
the endogenous determination of the wealth bias, where the distribution of
political power depends on wealth inequality itself.
The underlying framework is closely related to Bénabou (1996, 2000),
who also discusses consequences of deviations from the usual oneman
onevote case. There the bias in the political system is taken to be time
invariant and exogenously given, an assumption which we will relax in what
follows as indicated above. Moreover, our analysis differs to the respect
that we assume the wealth bias in the political system to depend on the
absolute level of individual wealth instead of relative wealth. Since the
single agent is not concerned with his rank in the wealth distribution when
voting over taxtransferschemes, because the absolute wealth level decides
on the individually preferred degree of tax progression, it is straightforward
to let the individual political weight to depend on absolute values, too.
Biased distribution of political power and inequality We start with de-
riving conditions on the individually preferred degree of redistribution and
discuss the implications of an exogenously given wealth bias for the dynam-
ics and longrun levels of redistribution, inequality and growth. The case
of an endogenously determined wealth bias will be considered in the next
section.
We assume that agents vote on the degree of tax progression in each pe-
riod of time. The overlapping generationsstructure of the model, where par-
ents only care about expected income instead of their offspring's expected
utility, allows us to disregard strategic interactions in an intertemporal con-
text. Otherwise, voters might have incentives to inuence future political
outcomes by altering the distributional dynamics via present actions.



















t collects all terms independent from tt, therefore being irrelevant
for the subsequent analysis. By utilizing (7), (8a) and (8b), the preferred tax
policy of agent i with wealth ki
t in period t can be determined by maximizing
(10) with respect to tt. The individually preferred degree of tax progression

















In what follows, we consider the consequences of a distorted political
system, where the bias is exogenously xed and time invariant. Different to
Bénabou (2000), we assume that the political weight wi of agent i depends
on his absolute level of wealth.3 If wi = (ki
t)l for some l ? 0, then the piv-
otal voter p has (log) wealth lnk
p
t = µt +ls2
t (cf. Bénabou, 2000, Prop. 6,
and the related proof). This means that, whenever l < 0, the pivotal agent
owns less wealth than the median voter, and the political system is biased
in favor of the poor. Conversely, the system displays an elitist image, if the
pivotal agent is wealthier than the median, that is l > 0. For l = 0, we have
the benchmark case of the standard median voter approach with wi = 1.
Applying these considerations in (11), i. e. the individually preferred tax
progressivity, enables us to derive the following results with respect to the
political equilibrium:
Proposition 2 (Political equilibrium with exogenous wealth bias) If the
pivotal agent p has (log) wealth ln k
p
t = µt +ls2
t , where l R 0, the equilib-










The equilibrium tax rate tt dependson the current level of inequality s2
t and the
wealth bias l according to the function tt  T(s2
t ;l), displaying the following
properties:
(i) The equilibrium rate T(s2
t ;l) is strictly decreasingin l, i. e. Tl(s2
t ; l)<0.
(ii) The effect of inequality on the degree of tax progression is ambiguous,
i. e. Ts2(s2
t ; l) R0, where the sign of the derivative depends on the degree
of distortion in the political system. In the special case of an unbiased
voting mechanism (i. e. l = 0), we have Ts2(s2
t ; 0) > 0 .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Thus, the interaction between redistribution and inequality depends on
the extent of the wealth bias in the political system. Whenever the bias l is
3This assumption is not essential for the cyclical dynamics of the model, which would
also appear, if we assumed the political weight to depend on relative wealth.
10not too large  in particular in the unbiased median voter case of l = 0 
the volume of redistribution increases with inequality.4
If, contrary, the bias in favor of the rich is sufciently large (only for
l  0), more inequality can lead to less redistribution. This means that
for a considerably uneven distribution of political power, we have a pivotal
voter who is rich enough to prefer less redistribution as inequality rises.
With tt = T(s2
t ;l) as the outcome of the political process, the dynamics








Regarding issues of existence and uniqueness of stationary solutions of (13)
we nd that these crucially depend on the size of l. We can state the fol-
lowing:
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of stationary solutions)
(i) For s2
u  b2s2
z, there exists a unique stationary solution s2
(l) to (13) iff
l < 1. This solution implies ¶s2
=¶l > 0 with liml!1s2
(l) = ¥ .
(ii) For s2
u >b2s2
z, there exists a unique stationary solution s2
(l) to (13) for
all l  1. There exists an upper bound ¯ l > 1, such that there are two
stationary solutions to (13) for l 2 (1;¯ l). With respect to the multiple
solutions, one is characterized by more redistribution and less inequality
than the other. No stationary solution s2
(l) exists for l > ¯ l .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Figure 1 shows, how the stationary level of inequality varies with the
bias of the political system l in the two cases described in Proposition 3.
The relation between the uninsurable and the insurable risk is crucial for the
emergence of multiple equilibria. The higher the uninsurable risk, the more
likely multiple equilibria occur. A value of l = 1 has the easy interpretation
of reecting the onedollaronevote case.
Regarding the dynamic properties of the model for a given level of the
wealth bias l, we can state the following:
4The median voter outcome is wellknown from the literature. Meltzer and Richard
(1981) were the rst to argue within a general equilibrium context that, if the underlying
distribution is rightskewed (e. g. here the lognormal distribution), the median voter always
prefers a positive amount of redistribution. Redistributive activities increase the poorer the











Figure 1: Stationary levels of inequality
Proposition 4 (Stability of stationary solutions) For s2
u b2s2
z, the unique
stationary solution to (13) is always stable. Whenever s2
u > b2s2
z, the station-
ary solution to (13) associated with lower inequality is stable, whereas the
solution associated with higher inequality is unstable.
Proof. See Appendix. 
That the dynamical system might display multiple equilibria in case of
an exogenously xed political bias is a wellknown feature from the analysis
of biased political systems (cf. Bénabou, 2000), but of minor importance
for our argument, since we are primarily interested in solutions which are
consistent with convergence to a stable equilibrium. For this reason, we
exclude the unstable equilibrium associated with a higher level of inequality
and a lower degree of tax progression from our discussion.
Endogenous cycles In order to formalize the idea of cyclical behavior of
the economic system, we now assume that the political bias lt depends on
the degree of inequality, measured by the variance of wealth. The underly-
ing law of motion is given by lt+1 = H(s2
t ). By this we posit that the extent
to which the future political system deviates from the `ideal' of the median
voter equilibrium is determined by the current level of wealth inequality.
With respect to the function H(s2), we furthermore assume that the value
of H declines with a growing variance of wealth, H0(s2) < 0, thus capturing








Figure 2: Phase diagram in the presence of an endogenous political bias
poor.5 The modications now lead us to a twodimensional system, jointly
describing the evolution of wealth inequality s2














t ) : (14b)
Figure 2 shows the associated phase diagram of the dynamical system.
It combines the information on the dynamics of inequality available from
Proposition 4 with the properties of H(s2
t ) as stated above. For illustrative
purposes, we established a simple linear relationship between the wealth
bias and inequality.6
Let us now analyze the dynamics of the model in the neighborhood of
the stationary point (s2
; l). Recall from our previous discussion of an ex-
ogenously xed political bias that, as we now extend the analysis to an
endogenously determined l, the argument is restricted only to those xed
points which were shown to be stable for l being held constant. Let the
parameter h = H0(s2
) < 0 denote the partial derivative of the political bias
with respect to inequality, evaluated at the stationary state. The dynamics
of the system (14a) and (14b) are then characterized as follows:
Proposition 5 (Hopfbifurcation) Let H0(s2
)=h, with h being a parameter.
Then there exists a value hb < 0, such that
5Accordingly, H0(s2) = 0 reects the above discussed case of an exogenous wealth bias.
6A linear functional form of H(s2) is sufcient for our argument, since the local dynamics
(i. e. the linearized system) are relevant in order to show the emergence of cycles.
13(i) s2
;l is a stable stationary solution of the system (14a) and (14b) for
all h > hb,
(ii) the dynamical system undergoes a Hopfbifurcation at the bifurcation
value hb.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 5 establishes the existence of cycles in our model. Since the
stability properties of the stationary point (s2
;l) depend on the value of h,
this represents a bifurcation parameter. As the phase diagram of Figure 2
already indicates, there exists a stable closed curve in the neighborhood of
the (now) unstable stationary point (s2
; l) for values h < hb. This closed
curve then represents an endogenous cycle of political participation, redis-
tribution and growth. The numerical simulations provided in Figure 3 below
demonstrate that the Hopfbifurcation is supercritical.
In these simulations we postulate a simple linear relationship for the
dynamics of political participation, lt+1 = h(s2
t  s2
), such that l = 0, and
set the parameters according to b = 0:98, g = 5, A = 1:5527, s2
u = 0:1 and
s2
z = 1. This implies a value of s2
 = 1:20629 for longrun wealth inequality
and an associated elasticity of posttax investment of t = 0:595135 in the
median voter equilibrium (l = 0), together with an empirically plausible
mean income growth rate of gy = 0:02 and an equilibrium value for the
Gini coefcient of around 0:56. The dynamical system now undergoes the
Hopfbifurcation for a value of h = hb =  3:47103. The simulation results
presented in Figure 3 are plotted for an arbitrarily chosen slope of h =  3:5,
satisfying the condition h < hb.
Figure 3(a) plots the cyclical interaction between wealth inequality and
political participation in the s2
t =ltplane, while Figure 3(b) displays the cor-
responding link between inequality and redistributive politics in the s2
t =tt
plane, and, nally, Figure 3(c) showing the tradeoff relationship between
growth and inequality in the s2
t =gyt+1plane. As becomes obvious, periods of
low growth due to a large amount of redistribution go along with a political
bias favoring the poor. In the course of decreasing wealth inequality, the
political power shifts towards the rich, who enforce taxtransferschemes
entailing a low degree of redistribution and larger growth rates. This causes
inequality to rise, thereby initiating a backward shift of power to the poor.
For an easier understanding, we have tagged two successive cycles on
the closed curve, the rst represented by the four consecutive points A, B,
C, the second given by A0, B0,C0, and D0. Consider rst the cyclical dynamics



















(a) Inequality and political participation



















(b) Inequality and tax progression



















(c) Inequality and growth
Figure 3: Cyclical dynamics of income inequality, redistribution and growth
15of wealth inequality and the bias in political participation. As indicated by
the dynamic system (14a) and (14b), the political bias will shift towards
the rich, whenever inequality is below its stationary value and vice versa,
whereas the opposite holds for changes in inequality, which rises, if the
political bias is above its stationary level of l = 0 and declines otherwise
(see also Figure 2).
Point A in Figure 3(a) reects a situation, where inequality is at its pos-
sibly lowest level, while the bias approximately attains its stationary level.
Consequently, wealth inequality as well as the political power of the rich
increase throughout the transition from A to B. Although inequality almost
reaches its stationary value in B, the political bias now exceeds l. In the
next instance, while wealth inequality rises even further, the bias already
declines. This indicates the transition from B to C. Point C forms the an-
tipode to A, again reecting a political bias being close to its stationary
value, whereas inequality now exceeds the level of s2
. This causes partici-
pation dynamics to shift the political power towards the poor, leading to a
decline in inequality in point D. Now, the bias in political participation is
below its stationary value, indicating further decreases in inequality, which
causes the political bias to rise again. The economy then moves to A0, the
starting point of the subsequent cycle which passes through B0, C0 and D0.
The cyclical behavior of redistributive politics and mean income growth
follows naturally. If we look at the transition from A to B  the rst charac-
terized by low inequality and a (almost) median voter outcome, the second
by larger inequality and a strong political bias towards the rich  we ob-
serve that redistributive activities decline. The extent of redistribution is
determined by two counteracting effects. On the one hand, the increase in
inequality supports higher taxation. On the other hand, the shift in the po-
litical bias lets the rich dominate the voting outcome, which works against
redistribution. The latter effect outweighs the rst, implying a lower degree
of tax progression which is accompanied by an increase in the growth rate
of mean income. Here, the positive incentive effect on the savings rate due
to less tax progressivity dominates the negative growth effect from an in-
crease in inequality due to the presence of imperfect capital markets, recall
eq. (9). Throughout the cycle the growth rate varies between  4% and 7%
and taxation is progressive over the entire cycle.7
7The lower bound of a feasible degree of tax progression for the given parameterization
of the model can be determined as t =  0:02. This does not exclude the possibility that, for
alternative specications of the model primitives, the system might also undergo phases of
regressive taxation.








Figure 4: Time path of mean income ¯ yt
Figure 4 nally shows the time path of mean income over an arbitrarily
chosen time span of 50 generations. The growth process is cyclical with a
frequency of four generations and possesses a nonregular amplitude. For
instance, cycles can display oneperiod recessions as well as recessions last-
ing for two periods. The peaks reect a comparably `elitist' society, whereas
the troughs correspond to a more `populist' system.
Having so far established the possible emergenceof redistributive cycles,
a natural next step is to investigate how sensitive the model dynamics are to
changes in the bifurcation parameter h, measuring the magnitude to which
the bias in political participation responds to changes in wealth inequality.
Figure 5 shows a bifurcation diagram of the model with respect to wealth
inequality. The numerical specication of the model is the same as used in
the above described simulations. The system (14a) and (14b) was simulated
over 7500 periods for different values of h, starting with values s2
0 and l0
close to the stationary point s2
; l and taking a step size for h of Dh =0:025.
The rst 5000 values for s2
t are dropped in order to exclude effects from
transitory dynamics.
The Figure shows the values of inequality which are visited during the
last 2500periods. As can be seen, a stable stationary solution exists for small
values h > hb. The supercritical Hopfbifurcation generates a stable closed
curve at the value hb   3:47103. The bifurcation diagram also reveals the
nonregular nature of the cycles in this area of numerical values for h. Each
point on the closed curve is visited as time moves on.8 If we reduce h further
8See the discussion of the two consecutive cycles A to D and A0 to D0 related to Figure 3.










Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram for inequality s2
below the bifurcation value hb, the dynamic behavior of the model changes
again, giving rise to regular cycles with a frequency of four periods. The
response of the political bias to changes in the extent of inequality is com-
parably strong, such that the economy is trapped in four states which are
repeatedly taking turns. The twofold switch in the dynamic behavior of the
system  rst from a stable stationary state to cyclical movements and sec-
ond from nonregular to regular cycles  is robust to changes in the model
primitives.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated a model of stochastic growth with incomplete
asset markets and heterogeneous agents, where redistributive cycles and
cyclical growth emerge as outcomes of voting processes over public tax
transfer schemes. Heterogeneity among agents stems from idiosyncratic
risks. The members of the society decide ex ante on the implementation
of a redistributive scheme. This, consequently, serves the simple purpose
of providing an insurance against unfavorable outcomes of current individ-
ual income shocks, whereas we assumed future risk to be nondiversiable.
Redistribution is not costlessly available. Costs accrue endogenously from
the redistributive process in terms of disincentives to save and subsequently
forgone growth.
Redistributive cycles emerge for the case of an uneven distribution of
political power, in particular, if we tie the degree of political participation to
18inequality itself. Supported by empirical evidence, it is sufcient to postulate
a negative relationship between the bias in the political system and wealth
inequality in order to establish cyclical behavior of redistributive activities
and growth.
From the economic point of view, the agents face two counteracting
forces. On the one hand, whenever inequality grows too large, inequality
(and risk) aversion leads to a larger extent of redistribution. On the other
hand, the equalizing effects stemming from a comparably high tax progres-
sion dampen individual prospects of upward mobility. This induces a shift in
the bias of political power towards the relatively rich, thereby causing more
and more agents to vote for a lower degree of progressivity in taxation. This
is accompanied by less redistribution, and lasts, until inequality again has
grown to an extent, where inequality aversion dominates the voting equi-
librium and a more progressive taxtransferscheme is reestablished. Since
redistribution provides negative incentives for individual saving, we also
observe a nonlinear pattern of saving and growth rates over the political
cycle.
From a technical point of view, the dynamic system undergoes a su-
percritical Hopfbifurcation, thereby allowing for the emergence of cyclical
behavior for an appropriate value of the bifurcation parameter, which here
measures the response of the bias in political power to changes in wealth
inequality. Up to now, this response is exogenous to the model. So it might
be a worthwhile extension of the preceding framework to endogenize the
established link between political participation and inequality by making it
subject to individual optimization. However, this issue is beyond the scope
of the present paper.
Simulations of the numerically specied model show that our approach
is capable of replicating growth rates in an empirically plausible range. The
economy passes through a cycle in four generations in our simulations,
which is not too overwhelming, if one takes `generations' literally, but be-
comes more convincing, if one is willing to focus on the average duration
of electoral cycles in modern democracies. Nevertheless, the model has to
pass the empirical test, which also is left for future work.
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Appendix
Derivation of the difference equation for (log) wealth By eqs. (3) and (5),
individual (log) wealth evolves according to the following difference equation:
ln ki
t+1 = ln zi
t +ln ˆ x i
t = ln zi
t +(1 tt)ln xi
t +tt ln ˜ x t (A.1)
In order to derive the breakeven level of (log) investment ln ˜ x t, let µy;t and s2
y;t
denote the rst and second moments of the distribution of (log) income. By (4)






















y;t=2+t ln ˜ x t :
Equating the RHS of both equations, yields the following expression for the break
even level of investment ln ˜ x t:






t = ln A+ln ui
t +b ln ki
t +(1 b) ln kt follows with (log) average wealth
given by lnkt = µt +s2
t =2:













Substituting these expressions into the denition of ln ˜ x t leads to:











Inserting this expression into (A.1) nally implies equation (7) of the text. 
22Proof of Proposition 2: After substitution of the savings rate s(tt) into the rst














G(t) is strictly increasing and convex in tt with G(t) ! ¥ for t ! 1 and G(t) !  ¥
for t !  ¥. In what follows, t = 1 1=b denotes the smallest longrun tax rate to
be consistent with a stationary level of inequality (see footnote 2 on page 6). This
implies G(t) =  s2
u and G0(t) =
b2
1+g +bs2
u. Let now t < ˜ t < 1 denote the unique
root of G(t).
The propertiesof G(t) imply that preferences of agents are single peaked over tt
such that there exists a unique solution to equation (A.2) for each level of individual
wealth ki




t , the tax rate of the political equilibrium is the solution to
G(tt) =  b2[l b(1 tt)]s2
t : (A.3)
For l given, the RHS of (A.3) is a linear function in tt, crossing the horizontal
axis at tt = 1 l=b, where increasing values of s2
t imply a clockwise rotation of
this function in the intersection point. (A.3) is solved at the intersection of the
nonlinear function G(tt) with the linear RHS of (A.3). Given the properties of
G(tt), this nally implies that the equilibrium tax rate in each period depends on
inequality s2
t and the wealth bias l according to a function tt = T(s2
t ;l), the latter
characterized by the following properties (see also Figure 6 for an illustration based
on two arbitrarily chosen levels l0 and l1):
(T.1) If l 0, we have Ts2(s2
t ;l) > 0 with T(s2
t ;l) ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0 and T(s2
t ;l) ! 1
for s2
t ! ¥.
(T.2) If 0 < l < b(1 ˜ t), we have Ts2(s2
t ;l) > 0 with T(s2
t ;l) ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0 and
T(s2
t ;l) ! 1 l=b for s2
t ! ¥.
(T.3) If l = b(1 ˜ t) > 0, we have T(s2
t ;l) = ˜ t for all s2
t  0.
(T.4) If b(1 ˜ t) < l < 1, we have Ts2
t (s2;l) < 0 with T(s2
t ;l) ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0 and
T(s2
t ;l) ! 1 l=b< t for s2
t ! ¥.
(T.5) If l = 1, we have Ts2
t (s2;l) < 0 with T(s2
t ;l) ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0 and T(s2
t ;l) ! t
for s2
t ! ¥.
(T.6) If l > 1, we have Ts2(s2
t ;l) < 0 with T(s2
t ;l) ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0 and T(s2
t ;l) !
1 l=b< t for s2
t ! ¥.
(T.7) T(s2;l) is strictly decreasing in l, i. e. for a given level of inequality s2, we
have Tl(s2;l) < 0.

Proof of Proposition 3: Let t denote the stationary tax rate. According to
(8b), the stationary level of inequality s2


















With b(1  ˜ t) > l0 > 0 (i. e. case (T.2)), the RHS of eq. (A.2) is given by the line AA0 with
slope  b3s2
t crossing the abscissa at 1 l0=b. An increase in s2
t leads to a clockwise rotation
of this line. Since 1 l0=b > ˜ t, the equilibrium tax rate increases, too. For s2
t ! ¥ we have
t ! 1 l0=b, while t ! ˜ t for s2
t ! 0. The value l1 (i. e. case (T.4)) implies that 1 l1=b > ˜ t.
Now, a clockwise rotation of the line BB0 goes along with a decrease of the equilibrium tax
rate.
Figure 6: Properties of T(s2
t ; l)
which requires t < t < 1. We also know from Proposition 2 that the stationary
rate t depends on inequality via the function t = T(s2
; l). This implies that a
stationary solution for inequality is characterized by the intersection of the function
S(t) with the function T(s2
;l). Together with the above discussed properties (T.1)
 (T.4) of T(s2; l), this immediately proves the existence of a unique stationary
solution, for l< 1 (see also Figure 7(a) for a graphical illustration). S(t) increases
with l, which follows from the observation that, by (A.4), the stationary level of
inequality S(t) rises as t decreases. Additionally, according to Proposition 2, t
decreases for an increase in l.
An open question is, whether or not there exists an interior solution for l =
1. In order to analyze this case, we insert the stationary value of inequality S(t)





1 b2(1 t)2 . The existence of a stationary solution for l=1
now demands a feasible tax rate to solve G(t) = M(t) with t < t < 1. With respect
















[1+b(1 t)]3 < 0 (A.5b)
Notice, that (A.5b) implies that M(t) is a concave function, with M0(t) being strictly
smaller than G0(t). Hence, no interior solution of G(t) = M(t) exists, whenever










The Figure shows the func-
tion S(t) together with func-
tions T(s2;l) for each of the dif-
ferentiated cases (T.1)(T.4) de-
scribed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2. The existence of a unique
stationary solution for l < 1 fol-
lows accordingly.









z, there exists a
unique intersection of T(s2;1)
with S(t). Therefore, multiple
solutions must exist for l > 1.
For l = ¯ l, the function T(s2;l)
is tangent to S(t).
(b) Multiple stationary solutions in case s2
u > b2s2
z
Figure 7: Stationary solutions
If s2
u > b2s2
z, we have G(t) < M(t), such that there exists an interior solution
(with t>t) for G(t)=M(t). This implies a unique intersection of the function S(t)
with the function T(s2
;1), yielding a solution t < t < 1.
Moreover, from T(s2;l) being strictly decreasing in l follows that there exists
an open set (1;¯ l), with ¯ l > 1, such that we also obtain feasible solutions to the
two equations S(t) as well as T(s2
;l) in the interval l 2 (1;¯ l). Since S(t) ! ¥ as
t ! t, while T(s2;l) ! 1 l=b < t as s2 ! ¥ we nd exactly two such solutions
for l 2 (1;¯ l) (see also 7(b) for a graphical illustration). 
25Proof of Proposition 4: The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 in Bénabou
(2000). As is proven there, a stationary solution (s2
;t) is stable, whenever the
curve s2 = S(t) cuts the curve t = T(s2;l) from above at (s2
;t).
From Proposition 2 then follows that in case of s2
u  b2s2
z this condition is met
and the unique stationary solution is always stable. In case of s2
u > b2s2
z, a unique
and stable stationary solution exists for identical reasons for all l  1. In case of
multiple stationary solutions, i. e. l 2 (1;¯ l), the stability condition stated above is
satised for the stationary solution associated with higher taxes and correspond-
ingly lower inequality. The second equilibrium associated with higher inequality is
unstable (see also Figures 7(a) and 7(b)). 
Proof of Proposition 5: The Jacobian matrix P of the twodimensional system










































The function f(n) on the left hand side of equation (A.6) is quadratic in n with roots
at n = 0 and at ˜ n = b2(1 t)2  2(1 t)(s2
u +b2s2
)Ts2. Notice that, according to
Proposition 4, (14a) displays stable dynamics for a given value of l, which implies
j˜ nj <1. Moreover, from Proposition 2 we know that Tl <0, such that the right hand
side of equation (A.6) is always negative as long as h < 0. Depending on the value
of h we are able to distinguish three cases for the roots associated with equation
(A.6): (a) two real roots with modulus less than one, or (b) conjugate complex
roots with modulus less than one, or (c) conjugate complex roots with modulus
greater than one. For a Hopfbifurcation to emerge at the bifurcation value h = hb,
the eigenvalues n = n(h) of the Jacobian must satisfy the following conditions (cf.
Azariadis, 1993, pp. 100):
(i) jn(hb)j = 1
(ii) n(hb)j 6= 1 for j = 1;2;3;4
(iii)
djn(h)j
dh h=hb 6= 0
If these conditions are met, there is an invariant closed curve bifurcating from hb.
In order to simplify the representation, let us write the above characteristic
polynomial as f(n) = n2 an = hb, where 0 < a < 1 and b > 0 Regarding condition
(i), the corresponding value of hb such that n(hb) = 1 is hb =  1=b. In this case the
roots are complex and can be written as n1;2 = Reiq, where R =
p
 hbb = 1 and




dh =  b 1
2 ( hb) 1=2 and condition (iii)
is satised too. With respect to condition (ii) which requires that the eigenvalues
at hb are not higher roots of unity, it is sufcient to mention, that this can always
be ruled out by a slightly perturbation of the parameters of the model. 
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